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Abstract
Adversarial attacks and defenses are currently active ar-
eas of research for the deep learning community. A re-
cent review paper divided the defense approaches into
three categories; gradient masking, robust optimization,
and adversarial example detection. We divide gradient
masking and robust optimization differently: (1) increas-
ing intra-class compactness and inter-class separation of
the feature vectors improves adversarial robustness, and
(2) marginalization or removal of non-robust image fea-
tures also improves adversarial robustness. By reframing
these topics differently, we provide a fresh perspective
that provides insight into the underlying factors that en-
able training more robust networks and can help inspire
novel solutions. In addition, there are several papers in
the literature of adversarial defenses that claim there is a
cost for adversarial robustness, or a trade-off between ro-
bustness and accuracy but, under this proposed taxonomy,
we hypothesis that this is not universal. We follow this up
with several challenges to the deep learning research com-
munity that builds on the connections and insights in this
paper.
1 Introduction
With advances in machine learning technology over the
past decade, the use of deep neural networks has had great
success in computer vision, speech recognition, robotics,
and other applications. Along with these remarkable im-
provements in performance, the recognition of vulnera-
bilities has also increased. As applications of deep neu-
ral networks are increasingly being deployed, the secu-
rity needs of these applications have come to the fore-
ground, especially for safety-required applications (i.e.,
self-driving vehicles) and adversarial domains where at-
tacks must be anticipated, such as defense applications.
A recent paper provides a comprehensive review of ad-
versarial attacks and defenses [38] and provides a taxon-
omy for both the adversarial attacks and defenses. Pulling
on the past literature, this review paper defines adversar-
ial examples as “inputs to machine learning models that
an attacker intentionally designed to cause the model to
make mistakes”. Here, we present a new perspective on
adversarial defenses that we believe can provide clarity
and inspire novel defenses to adversarial attacks.
The taxonomy of adversarial defense in Xu, et al. [38]
consists of three categories: gradient masking, robust op-
timization, and adversarial detection. Gradient masking
includes input data preprocessing (i.e., jpeg compression
[13], thermometer encoding [2], adversarial logit pairing
[8]), defensive distillation [26], randomization of the deep
neural network models (i.e., randomly choosing a model
from a set of models [34] or using dropout [7, 9]), and
the use of generative models (i.e., PixelDefend [31] and
Defense-GAN [29]). The theme of this diverse set of de-
fenses is to make it more difficult to create adversarial
examples and attacks but Athalye, et al. [1] demonstrate
that gradient masking techniques are ineffective1.
1Specifically, they test the defenses at the ICLR 2018 challenge and
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The second category in this taxonomy is called robust
optimization, and it includes the popular defense method
of adversarial training [12], regularization methods that
minimize the effects of small perturbations of the input
(i.e., Jacobian regularization [17]), and provable defenses
(i.e., Reluplex algorithm [3]). Adversarial training is a
form of data augmentation where adversarial examples
are added to or replace the benign training data. Adversar-
ial training is an important defense discussed in the litera-
ture, and variations have been proposed, such as ensemble
adversarial training where the adversarial examples are
computed from a set of pretrained classifiers [34]. Ro-
bust optimization includes methods for making deep neu-
ral networks behave more robustly to the presence of ad-
versarial perturbations in the input, which is the primary
focus of our taxonomy in Section 2.
The third category in this review paper is to detect the
presence of adversarial examples in the input in order to
protect trained classifiers. That is, one can design a sep-
arate model to classify if a sample is benigned or adver-
sarial. Carlini andWagner [5] rigorously demonstrate that
the properties of adversarial examples are not easy to de-
tect.
For our purposes, we consider adversarial robustness to
include all approaches for training networks to improve
that network’s performance on adversarial examples. We
focus primarily on category 2 of the above taxonomy but
we also include many of the methods in their category
1. We propose this new taxonomy on adversarial robust-
ness to provide insight to the underlying factors that en-
able training more robust networks.
In addition, there are several papers in the literature of
adversarial attacks and defenses that claim there is a cost
for robustness, such that greater robustness requires more
data [30], larger model complexity [20], and longer train-
ing times. Furthermore, there are claims of trade-offs be-
tween robustness and accuracy [35, 18], and even robust-
ness and simplicity [23]. There appears to be widespread
acceptance of these claims as universal. Another moti-
vation of our work is to demonstrate that these claims are
appropriate only for a subset of existing methods for train-
ing in adversarial robustness.
While there are other taxonomies mentioned in other
found that 7 of 9 defenses relied on obfuscated gradients and their at-
tacks successfully circumvent 6 completely, and 1 partially.
papers, they offer only well-known factors for dividing
approaches. Guo, et al. [13] divide the work in adver-
sarial robustness into model-specific strategies (i.e., ad-
versarial training [12], regularization methods [17]) and
model-agnostic methods (i.e., input preprocessing [39]).
Zhang, et al. divide adversarial defense into three cate-
gories of data preprocessing [13], gradient masking [1],
and adversarial training [12]. Here we reframe the cate-
gory of making networks adversarially robust in order to
provide a fresh perspective and inspire novel solutions in
a way these other taxonomies do not.
2 Our taxonomy
There have been several recent papers showing that us-
ing metric learning loss functions during training helps
in making neural networks more robust to adversarial ex-
amples [25, 22, 21]. Mustafa, et al. [22] used their own
variation of the contrastive center-loss [27] that encour-
ages both intra-class compactness and inter-class separa-
tion of the feature vectors or logits, which are the activa-
tions from the last hidden layer. The center loss [36] is a
loss function that encourages the feature vectors for each
class to lie close to each other (i.e., it encourages intra-
class compactness) and the contrastive center-loss func-
tion is a generalization of it that also encourages inter-
class separation. We claim that these works imply a gen-
eral factor for adversarial robustness, which can be stated
as:
Category 1: Increasing intra-class compactness and
inter-class separation of the feature vectors improves ad-
versarial robustness.
There are several other papers that can be categorized
under Category 1. Wu and Yu [37] postulate that the train-
ing of deep models decreases the average margin while
increasing the minimummargin, and recommend increas-
ing the average margin (i.e., the inter-class separation).
Galloway, et al. [10] suggest that batch normalization is a
cause of adversarial vulnerability. This aligns with Cate-
gory 1 because batch normalization constrains the magni-
tude of the feature vectors (i.e., the activations in the next
to the last layer, which is input to the fully connected and
softmax layers). Hence, batch normalization limits inter-
class separation and therefore it can increase adversarial
vulnerability.
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It is particularly interesting to note that the de-
fensive distillation approach [26] utilizes Category 1.
Defensive distillation uses two networks and modifies
softmax by dividing by a temperature T , such that
softmax(Z(θ, x)/T ), where Z(θ, x) is the feature vec-
tor, x is the input sample, and θ are the network’s weights.
In a rigorous paper by Carlini and Wagner [4], they de-
scribe the mechanism behind defensive distillation, they
state “When we train a distilled network at temperature T
and then test it at temperature 1, we effectively cause the
inputs to the softmax to become larger by a factor of T.”
Since the architecture used in defensive distillation does
not contain batch normalization2, the average magnitude
for the feature vectors increases by T, thereby increasing
the inter-class separation. Based on their analysis, we hy-
pothesis that the teacher network (even without distilla-
tion) will also show signs of robustness and that adding
batch normalization to the architecture or using a feature
based attack [28] will break the effectiveness of defensive
distillation. We leave testing these speculations as future
work.
Additionally, there are a number of papers in the lit-
erature focused on improving generalization (but not ro-
bustness) by increasing intra-class compactness and inter-
class separation of the feature vectors, such as center-
loss [36], contrastive center-loss [27], and lifted structures
[24], as well as papers that have appeared recently, such
as G-Softmax [19] and Softmax dissection [14]. Category
1 implies that these methods will improve both general-
ization and robustness, and we leave testing this as future
work.
However, improving both generalization and robust-
ness appears to contradict the conjecture of papers in the
literature that suggest there is a trade-off between test ac-
curacy and adversarial robustness [35, 18]. This implies
the existence of at least one other Category of adversarial
robustness where this might be true. One possible set of
defenses include image preprocessing [13, 39] and gra-
dient masking methods (see [1]). Image preprocessing
approaches are based on reducing or eliminating “non-
robust” adversarial perturbations in the training images.
Adversarial perturbations were described as “non-
robust features” by Ilyas, et al. [16]. Ilyas, et al. postulate
2See the code for [6], which is available at
https://github.com/carlini/nn_robust_attacks
that machines use all the image features that are discrim-
inatory between classes (assuming the task is classifica-
tion), even those features that are invisible to humans. Ad-
versarial training [33] specifically includes training im-
ages with non-robust features (i.e., adversarial examples)
in order for the network to learn to classify examples with
non-robust features properly.
We too believe as described in Ilyas, et al. [16] that
humans and machines perform tasks differently. For ex-
ample, humans are limited in the number of image fea-
tures they use in making a decision while machines are
much less limited. Adversarial examples exist where we
expect human performance from a machine. To attain
human performance from a machine, we can manually
eliminate non-robust features from the training images via
preprocessing or make all non-robust image features non-
discriminatory with approaches such as adversarial train-
ing.
If we consider the network’s training, we realize that
as it learns, it averages away the non-discriminatory im-
age features as “nuisance variables”. This is analogous to
computing the marginal probability by summing or inte-
grating the nuisance variables [11]. Hence, using a bit of
inductive reasoning, we hypothesis a second Category for
adversarial robustness:
Category 2: Marginalization or removal of non-robust
image features improves adversarial robustness.
Many of the papers on adversarial robustness seem to
lie within this Category 2, including adversarial training
[33] and methods of gradients masking [1]. In addition,
we show below with a toy example that there is a trade-
off between accuracy and adversarial robustness [35] for
methods that fall under Category 2 (Note: while many of
the papers on the trade-off between accuracy and robust-
ness use the adversarial training defense, a similar argu-
ment holds for it).
The most obvious way to train a network at human per-
formance levels is to modify the training data to only con-
tain the robust information we want it to use in classifica-
tion. One extreme way to eliminate non-robust image fea-
tures is to preprocess the training and test images with an
edge detection algorithm to produce binary edge images.
These edge images commonly display shape information
that humans are able to use to recognize objects. Train-
ing a network on edge images results in a highly robust
network because all non-visible perturbations have been
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removed. However, the performance on benign images
is reduced due to a decrease in discriminatory informa-
tion between classes in the edge detection images relative
to the original imagery. This example demonstrates the
trade-off between accuracy and adversarial robustness. Of
course, edge imagery leaves minimal discriminatory in-
formation and there is a range of preprocessing that falls
on the spectrum between human and machine image fea-
tures, such as low pass filtering (i.e., DFT [39]), denois-
ing, sparse coding, synthetic imagery, and jpeg compres-
sion [13]. Note that it is possible to create examples that
can fool even a network trained on edge examples bymak-
ing large visible changes to the input, but the current defi-
nitions of adversarial examples include making small im-
perceptible changes.
To the best of our knowledge, most of the methods in
the literature for attaining adversarial robustness fall un-
der Category 2. The goal of these methods is to marginal-
ize the non-robust features. This explains why training
on more data improves the adversarial robustness of deep
networks (i.e., increases the likelihood of non-robust fea-
tures appearing in different classes to be marginalized
away as nuisance variables) [32]. This also explains the
added adversarial robustness from Jacobian regularization
[17], where the loss function trains the network to be in-
variant to small, non-robust features. It also suggests new
methods to obtain adversarial robustness, such as a variant
of adversarial training where one adds the same perturba-
tion to images of different classes to make that perturba-
tion non-discriminatory.
An important avenue for future work is to verify our
hypothesis of these two Categories by testing some of the
new methods for adversarial robustness implied by them.
3 Discussion
While we believe that we have presented a few novel con-
nections and insights that we have not seen in the litera-
ture, we must still ask if this taxonomy is useful and if so,
how.
First, this taxonomy suggests that both robustness and
generalization can be improved simultaneously. It clari-
fies that papers declaring there is a trade-off between ro-
bustness and accuracy are misleading because the trade-
off is not universal. We suggest the deep learning com-
munity take up the challenge to discover ways to improve
both robustness and generalization rather than pursue the
current focus of improving robustness at the expense of
accuracy. Techniques based on metric learning appear to
offer performance improvements in both, and other meth-
ods may also exist. Of course, the other side of this chal-
lenge is to create new attacks that defeat any new defenses
that improve both generalization and robustness.
Second, our paper proposes eliminating non-robust fea-
tures from the training data so that trained networks learn
to only rely on robust image features. But we don’t de-
lineate an optimal way to process images to contain only
robust features. Obviously binary edge detection images
are too extreme as they also eliminate many robust im-
age features. On the other hand, after low pass filtering
(i.e., image blurring) non-robust features still remain. The
challenge still remains to discover an ideal preprocessing
method or combination of methods.
Third, new network training methods can be inspired
by our analogy of training to marginalization. For exam-
ple, data preprocessing and augmentation can insure that
non-robust image features are explicitly present in mul-
tiple or all classes to insure that the network treats them
as non-discriminatory. Similarly, marginalization implies
that the training methodology in few-shot meta-learning
of changing the tasks every iteration creates more univer-
sal features that will be beneficial in transfer learning and
perhaps in other scenarios. In addition, the community
can investigate better training data combinations that op-
timally marginalize non-robust features. There is much
additional work to be done in this direction to better un-
derstand the theoretical and practical aspects of marginal-
ization.
Fourth, the separation of methods for making networks
more robust into two Categories implies that methods
from each Category can be productively combined. The
combination of methods from each Category should pro-
vide different strengths to a network or an ensemble of
networks. Combine these with the best methods for each
of the categories in Xu, et al. [38], and one has an en-
semble with the potential to make a solid defense. Un-
fortunately, the paper with a title “Ensembles of weak de-
fenses are not strong” [15] is misleading because in that
paper the authors only tested ensembles of defenses that
all fall into a single category, such as detectors or our
Category 2 above. He, et al. [15] do mention that their
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“adaptive adversarial examples transfer across several de-
fenses” which might “explain why ensembling is not an
effective approach”. It is obvious that each defense in an
ensemble must provide some strengths that are orthogo-
nal to all the other defenses and an ensemble of many near
identical defenses is not useful.
For example, a potential ensemble might include the
best adversarial example detector (e.g., Carlini and Wag-
ner [5] found the Bayesian uncertainty estimate of Fein-
man, et al. [9] to be the strongest of those they tested), as
well as a network trained by ensemble adversarial training
[34], plus a dropout network that hides the gradient (i.e.,
Athalye, et al. compare several methods for hiding gra-
dients and found that randomization [7] to be most effec-
tive), and networks each from the two Categories in our
taxonomy (i.e., one trained with metric learning and an-
other trained on edge detection images, which will force
image perturbations to be visible or else they will be elim-
inated during preprocessing).
We conjecture that a diverse ensemble, with each mem-
ber offering orthogonal strengths, will be a strictly more
powerful defense than any one defense. Ablation studies
of an ensemble’s members can determine if each member
adds to the security of the system. A rigorous analysis
of an ensemble’s strengths will also identify its remain-
ing weaknesses and further defense efforts can focus on
eliminating these weaknesses.
In addition, we hypothesis in this paper that several of
the new methods based on metric learning for improving
generalization in the literature [19, 14] will also improve
robustness. If this is confirmed, there will be numerous
other methods in the literature i.e., [36, 27] that will im-
prove robustness but have not been demonstrated yet. At
this time we admit that there are many items in this pa-
per where we state that these are left for future work and
even these items are more than we have time to pursue on
our own. Hence, we call out to the research community to
collaborate with us to investigate some of these items.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we expand the area of adversarial robust-
ness into a taxonomy with two categories; Category 1:
increasing intra-class compactness and inter-class sepa-
ration of the feature vectors improves adversarial robust-
ness, and Category 2: marginalization or removal of non-
robust image features also improves adversarial robust-
ness. This taxonomy permits an understanding of the un-
derlying factors that drive the adversarial robustness of the
known methods, and this understanding allows exploring
new methods with the same underlying factors.
In addition, we attempt to dispel several potential mis-
understandings and set forth several challenges to the
deep learning community, such as the discovery of new
methods that improve both robustness and generalization.
There are also a number of research items left as future
work, such as optimal ways to eliminate non-robust fea-
tures from the training data via preprocessing or to opti-
mally marginalize non-robust features via training.
We also propose that a diverse ensemble of defenses,
with each member offering orthogonal strengths, will be
a strictly more powerful approach than any one defense.
An ensemble of defenses should include all the strongest
defenses and should be tested against all of the strongest
attacks, in order to find the remaining weaknesses. Then
further research on robustness can concentrate on only the
remaining holes in the defenses.
We also call on researchers to go further with adversar-
ial defense than is typically done today in the literature.
In addition to the challenge of improving both robust-
ness and generalization, researchers can attempt to simul-
taneously solve multiple other limitations of deep learn-
ing, such as reducing the amount of labeled training data
needed and creating adaptable networks that learn contin-
uously.
Futhermore, adversarial defenses must go further than
working on small imagery such as MNIST and Cifar,
which are the most common benchmarks in the adversar-
ial examples literature. The community seems ready to
venture into higher resolution imagery of ImageNet and
real world imagery, such as satellite imagery.
Eventually, the research and engineering communities
will need to investigate adversarial attacks and defenses
in the context of safety-required applications (i.e., self-
driving vehicles) and adversarial domains where attacks
must be anticipated, such as defense applications. It is
only in the context of these applications where complete
and secure solutions can be discovered.
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